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Immunizing Arbitrators From Claims for
Equitable Relief
Michael D. Moberly*
I. INTRODUCTION

Both state' and federal courts have consistently held that arbitrators cannot
be subjected to civil liability for acts performed in the course and scope of their
arbitral duties.2 This concept of "arbitral immunity" developed out of the more
familiar judicial and quasi-judicial immunity doctrines, 3 and reflects the inherent
similarity of the judicial and arbitral processes. 4 In both situations, parties rely
on impartial decision-makers to resolve their disputes.' Similarly, both arbitrators and judicial officers need protection from parties that may sue because they
are unhappy with a ruling.6 The Sixth Circuit explained this principle in the
following terms:

* B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix,
Arizona.
1. See Feichtinger v. Conant, 893 P.2d 1266, 1267 (Alaska 1995) ("Arbitral immunity is the
rule in virtually all jurisdictions, and we now adopt it.") (footnote omitted); Baar v. Tigerman, 211
Cal. Rptr. 426, 428 (Ct. App. 1983) ("Courts of this country have long recognized immunity to
protect arbitrators from civil liability for actions taken in the arbitrator's quasi-judicial capacity.");
cf. Seligman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 756 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (noting that "rules precluding lawsuits against arbitration tribunals and arbitrators have been upheld by the courts of this state
and other jurisdictions").
2. See Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[Tlhe
Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue have uniformly immunized arbitrators from civil
liability for all acts performed in their arbitral capacity.") (citing cases).
3. See Int'l Med. Group, Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 615, 629 (S.D.
Ind. 2001), aff'd, 312 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2002) (characterizing arbitral immunity as "an extension of judicial immunity"); United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. SIPCO, Inc., 138
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2917, 2918 (S.D. Iowa 1990) ("Arbitral immunity is an outgrowth of the doctrine
of judicial immunity .... ").
4. See Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the
"functional comparability of. . . arbitrators' decision-making process and judgments to those of
judges"); Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1210 (6th Cir. 1982) ("[Alrbitration proceedings resemble judicial proceedings in several respects.").
5. See City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 294 N.W.2d 68, 130 (Mich. 1980)
(Levin, J., dissenting) ("We expect independence and impartiality in a judge or ... arbitrator.");
Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, Arbitral Immunity, 11 INDus. REL. L.J. 228, 234 (1989) ("An
arbitrator's decisionmaking... is, without doubt, functionally comparable to that of a judge. Like a
judge, an arbitrator must render an impartial decision based on evidence and applicable interpretive
principles.").
6. See Olson v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 85 F.3d 381, 382 (8th Cir. 1996).
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The functional comparability of the arbitrators' decision-making process
and judgments to those of judges ... generates the same need for independent
judgment, free from the threat of lawsuits. Immunity furthers this need. As
with judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, arbitral immunity is essential to protect the decision-maker from undue influence and protect the decision-making
process from reprisals by dissatisfied litigants.7
But these doctrines traditionally provide "an immunity from damages... not
an immunity from declaratory or injunctive relief." 8 The judicial immunity
doctrine, for example, generally does not preclude the imposition of injunctive
relief against judicial officers. 9 The same is true of quasi-judicial immunity, 0
which extends traditional judicial immunity to individuals "performing tasks so
integral or intertwined with the judicial process that [they] are deemed to be an
arm of the [judiciary].""
This limitation on the immunity available to judicial and quasi-judicial officers suggests that arbitrators also may be subject to suit for declaratory or injunctive relief. 2 In fact, one of the few prior commentators to address the issue
expressed this view. 3 However, there is actually surprisingly little case law

7. Corey, 691 F.2d at 1211.
8. Browning v. Vernon, 874 F. Supp. 1112, 1124 (D. Idaho 1994), af'd, 44 F.3d 818 (9th
Cir. 1995); see also Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 855 (10th Cir. 1981) ("[l]mmunity from
liability in damages may not bar prospective relief, injunction, for example, against a judge."); Fixel
v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 593, 597 (D. Nev. 1990) (stating that "immunity is not a defense
against injunctive relief').
9. United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 861 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 860 n.8 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that claims for declaratory relief "are not
jurisdictionally barred" by the judicial immunity doctrine, which merely "protects judges and their
agents from suits involving monetary damages").
10. See Williams v. McGinnis, 192 F. Supp. 2d 757, 759 (E.D. Mich. 2002) ("[Q]uasi-judicial
immunity does not usually preclude declaratory relief."); Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp.
2d 1244, 1252 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("[Q]uasi-judicial immunity provides immunity from damages but
not injunctive relief."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 251 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2001); Schmidt v.
Degen, 376 F. Supp. 664, 670 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("As a general rule, the immunity doctrine will not
preclude the granting of equitable relief against judicial or quasi-judicial officials.").
11. Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Quasi-judicial immunity, like judicial
immunity, derives historically from the recognition that participation in the court system raises a
significant risk of 'entanglement in vexatious litigation."') (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511,521 (1985)).
12. See generally Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[An arbitrator has
an immunity analogous to judicial immunity because he performs a quasi-judicial function."); Yates
v. Yellow Freight Sys., 501 F. Supp. 101, 105 (S.D. Ohio 1980) ("A validly appointed arbitrator is
clothed with immunity analogous to judicial immunity against actions brought by either of the parties arising out of the performance of his duties."); Higdon, 71 S.W.3d at 132 (discussing "the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, to which arbitral immunity is often compared").
13. See Richard J. Mattera, Note, Has the Expansion of Arbitral Immunity Reached Its Limits
After United States v. City of Hayward, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. REsOL. 779, 795, n.124 (1997) ("As
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discussing this subject, 4 and the courts that have considered it are not in agreement. 5 This article attempts to reconcile these seemingly conflicting authorities. "
The article begins with a summary of the historical origins of the judicial
and arbitral immunity doctrines. 7 Next, the article discusses the courts' refusal
to extend judicial immunity to claims for declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief,'8 except perhaps in the case of federal judges. 9 The article then
explores the propriety of recognizing a similar limitation in cases construing the
arbitral immunity doctrine.2" The article ultimately concludes that (1) arbitrators
should be immune from claims for equitable relief as a matter of policy,2' and

a matter of law, arbitral immunity does not act to bar claims for equitable relief.") (citing TWA, Inc.
v. Sinicropi, No. 93 CIV. 3094 (CSH), 1994 WL 132233 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1994)).
14. See . & F. Corp. v. Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers, Local 8,
493 F. Supp. 147, 150 (S.D. Ohio 1980) ("There is relatively little case law in the federal courts on
the subject of an arbitrator's immunity from suit."); McKown v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 444 S.E.2d
114, 115 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the propriety of naming the arbitrator as a defendant "in
judicial proceedings seeking to enjoin arbitration" has "rarely [been] addressed").
15. See generally Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 780 F. Supp. 885,
896 (D. Conn. 1991) (stating that "the law is unsettled on the appropriateness of injunctive relief in
...

arbitration situations").

16. Some courts have reserved judgment on this issue. See, e.g., Greenfield & Montague
Transp. Area v. Donovan, 758 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1985) ("[W]e need not address ... arguments
that [an arbitrator] enjoys arbitral immunity from a suit [for declaratory and injunctive relief]."); Int'l
Union, United Autoworkers of Am. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 1181, 1187 n.10 (6th Cir.
1983) ("We intimate no viewpoint ... as to whether the doctrine of arbitral immunity would bar an
action for equitable relief .... ").
17. For a prior discussion of the origins of judicial immunity, see J. Randolph Block, Stamp v.
Sparkman and the History of JudicialImmunity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879. For a discussion of the history of arbitral immunity, see Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 229-36.
18. See Hammond v. Creative Fin. Planning Org., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (E.D. Pa.
1992) ("A judge is not immune from suit where the plaintiff seeks prospective relief rather than
damages."). For a previous discussion of this limitation on judicial immunity, see Thomas J. Noto
III, Note, Pulliam v. Allen: Delineating the Immunity of Judges From Prospective Relief, 34 CATH.
U.L. REV. 829 (1984).
19. See generally Switzer v. Coan, 261 F.3d 985, 990 n.9 (10th Cir. 2001) ("The Supreme
Court [has] held ... that judicial immunity does not insulate state judges from claims for equitable
relief ... and it is unsettled whether the corresponding immunity afforded federal judges ... permits
or precludes such claims.") (citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)).
20. See generally Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 229 ("Surprisingly little has been written
about arbitral immunity; thus its proper scope and limitations ... remain unexamined.").
21. See generally Corey, 691 F.2d at 1211 ("[T]he limits of [arbitral] immunity should be
fixed in part by federal policy."); L & H Airco, Inc. v. Rapistan Corp., 446 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn.
1989) (noting that arbitral immunity "rests upon considerations of public policy"); Babylon Milk &
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(2) in jurisdictions where that result is currently precluded by existing precedent,
a comparable result can be reached by holding that the arbitrator is not a necessary party in litigation
challenging the arbitrator's authority or the validity of an
22
arbitration award.
II. THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL AND ARBITRAL IMMUNITY
The courts have long held that judges cannot be subjected to civil liability
for acts performed within the scope of their authority. 23 This principle has been
traced to Lord Coke's 1607 decision in Floyd & Barker,24 which held that judges
of England's principal common law court, the King's Bench,25 were immune
from suit in competing courts for acts taken in their judicial capacity. 26 The
principle was subsequently expanded to afford comparable immunity to all
judges. 27 The need for this immunity was so clear that the United States Supreme Court, which formally adopted the judicial immunity doctrine in Bradley
v. Fisher,2" has noted that "[flew doctrines were more solidly established at

Cream Co. v. Horvitz, 151 N.Y.S.2d 221, 224 (Sup. Ct. 1956) ("Considerations of public policy are
the reasons for the [arbitral immunity] rule .. "), af'd, 165 N.Y.S.2d 717 (App. Div. 1957).
22. See, e.g., Int'l Med. Group, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 615:
[A] claim intended to determine whether an arbitral body has the authority to proceed is one
in which the arbitral body itself has no real interest and its decision-making in this regard
would be protected by 'arbitral immunity,' or, alternatively, is one in which the body is not
properlyjoined ....
Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
23. See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Anglo-American common law has
long recognized judicial immunity, a 'sweeping form of immunity' for acts performed by judges that
relate to the 'judicial process."') (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988)); Laskowski
v. Mears, 600 F. Supp. 1568, 1572 (N.D. Ind. 1985) ("Long ago, the Supreme Court reorganized that
judicial officers in general are not subject to civil liability for judicial acts done within their jurisdiction.") (citing Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. 89 (1849)).
24. Floyd & Barker, 12 Co. Rep. 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1607).
25. See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 546 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that "the King's Bench was
the central common law court" in medieval England); cf Wightman v. Jones, 809 F. Supp. 474,477,
n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (describing the King's Bench as a "common law court" with appellate jurisdiction over other "inferior" common law courts).
26. See Pulliam,466 U.S. at 530 (discussing Floyd & Barker).
27. See id. at 531 ("In time, Coke's theory was expanded.., so that judges of all courts were
accorded immunity, at least for actions within their jurisdiction."); see, e.g., Schmidt, 376 F. Supp. at
669 (rejecting the proposition that a justice of the peace, as "a relatively low-level member of the
judiciary, is not entitled to the same sweeping degree of judicial immunity as a higher placed judge,"
and holding that justices of the peace instead have "precisely the same judicial immunity from suits
for damages as any other judge, irrespective of level").
28. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335 (1872); see Corey, 691 F.2d at 1209 n.4 (noting
that the "principle behind the doctrine of judicial immunity [was] first adopted by the Supreme Court
in Bradley v. Fisher").
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common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts
'9
committed within their judicial jurisdiction.
While arbitral immunity is of more recent origin,' and has never been spe3
cifically adopted by the Supreme Court, ' it is now also well entrenched in
33
32
American law. The doctrine's history was discussed in Hill v. Aro Corp.,
where the court traced its judicial recognition to two nineteenth century state
35
court decisions, 4 Jones v. Brown and Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v.
O'Brien.36 The Hill court noted that recognition of the doctrine was premised
on the view that "arbitrators 'are in a certain sense a court,"' and thus should be
29. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967).
30. See, e.g., Feichtinger, 893 P.2d at 1268 ("[B]efore this decision, no Alaska case had
addressed the issue of arbitral immunity."); Higdon, 71 S.W.3d at 132 (noting that "no Kentucky
appellate decision [had] addressed the arbitral-immunity doctrine"). As noted earlier, the arbitral
immunity doctrine was "adapted" from the established judicial immunity doctrine. Howland v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 209 F. Supp. 2d 586, 592 (W.D.N.C. 2002). Its later development undoubtedly stems
in part from the fact that agreements to arbitrate disputes "were not enforced at common law on the
ground that they deprived the courts of jurisdiction to resolve the controversy." Portland Gen. Elec.
Co. v. U.S. Bank Trust Nat'l Ass'n, 218 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2000).
31. See Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and
ProfessionalArbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 476 (2004) ("The United States Supreme Court has
never specifically endorsed arbitrator immunity .. "); cf William T. D'Zurilla, Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 42 LA. B.J. 474 (1995) ("The U.S. Supreme Court has granted judges full exemption
from liability for actions within the scope of their duties. The lower federal courts have unanimously extended similar immunity to arbitrators.") (emphasis added).
32. See Howland, supra note 30 (noting that the arbitral immunity doctrine "has been uniformly recognized and consistently followed"); Moore v. Conliffe, 871 P.2d 204, 214 (Cal. 1994)
("There is hardly any aspect of arbitration law and practice more settled, both in domestic and international relations, than the immunity of arbitrators from court actions for their activities in arriving
at their award.") (quoting Martin Domke, The Arbitrator'sImmunity from Liability: A Comparative
Survey, 3 U. TOL. L. REV. 99,99 (1971)).
33. Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
34. See id. at 325; see also L & F. Corp., 493 F. Supp. at 150 (noting that the court in Hill
"surveyed the law regarding arbitral immunity"); Corbin v. Wash. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 278 F.
Supp. 393, 397 (D.S.C.) (stating that the Hill court engaged in "an exhaustive and scholarly review
of the pertinent cases"), aff'd, 398 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1968).
35. Jones v. Brown, 6 N.W. 140 (Iowa 1880); see also Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 235
("The 1880 Iowa decision of Jones v. Brown is most frequently cited as the first case on point.")
(footnote omitted); Weston, supra note 31, at 484-85 ("A history of arbitral immunity in the United
States can be traced back as early as 1880 in Jones v. Brown.").
36. Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424 (1884); see also Robert
H. Smit & Nicholas J. Shaw, The Centerfor Public Resources Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration of InternationalDisputes: A Critical and Comparative Commentary, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
275, 322 n.212 (1999) (describing Hoosac Tunnel as "a much cited state court decision" recognizing
the arbitral immunity doctrine).

329
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"clothed with the same immunity as the judiciary."37 The court then quoted with
approval the rationale for the doctrine first articulated in Hoosac Tunnel:
An arbitrator is a quasi judicial officer, under our laws, exercising judicial
functions. There is as much reason in his case for protecting and insuring his
impartiality, independence, and freedom from undue influences, as in the case of
a judge or juror. The same considerations of public policy apply, and we are of
the opinion that the same immunity extends to him. 38
III.

THE "EQUITABLE" EXCEPTION TO JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

A. The GeneralRule: Judges Are Not Immune From Equitable Claims
Given the arbitral immunity doctrine's roots in the concept of judicial immunity," courts considering the scope of an arbitrator's immunity have consistently looked to judicial immunity cases for guidance, n' and generally hold that
arbitrators should be immune from suit to the same extent as judges.41 The present issue thus arises primarily from the Supreme Court's holding in Pulliam v.
Allen42 that judicial immunity does not preclude an award of injunctive relief
against judicial officers,43 and the attendant presumption that an arbitrator's
immunity "should be no broader." '
37. Hill, 263 F. Supp. at 325 (quoting Jones, 6 N.W. at 142).
38. Id. (quoting Hoosac Tunnel, 137 Mass. at 426); see also Int'l Union, 701 F.2d at 1186
("[T]he public policy considerations of protecting a judge's or a juror's impartiality, independence,
and freedom from undue influence apply with equal force as to arbitrators.").
39. See Howland, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 593 ("The doctrine of arbitral immunity is rooted in the
doctrine of judicial immunity .... ) (quoting Galuska v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 210 F.3d 374, 2000 WL
347851, at *2 (7th Cir. 2000)); Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tex. v. Juneau, 114 S.W.3d 126, 131 (Tex.
App. 2003) ("Arbitral immunity is derived from judicial immunity ..
"); Nolan & Abrams, supra
note 5, at 229 ("Arbitral immunity stems from judicial immunity.").
40. See Int'l Med. Group, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 628 ("Courts have... analogiz[ed] to the principle of judicial immunity to shape the contours of arbitral immunity to suit."); Olney v. Sacramento
County Bar Ass'n, 260 Cal. Rptr. 842, 844 (Ct. App. 1989) ("We shall ... examine the scope of
arbitrator ... immunity by reviewing the scope of the immunity afforded judges."); cf L & H Airco,
Inc., 446 N.W.2d at 382 (Yetka, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The standard for
arbitral immunity is related to the scope of judicial immunity.").
41. See, e.g., Babylon Milk & Cream Co. v. Horvitz, 151 N.Y.S.2d 221, 224 (Sup. Ct. 1956)
("[T]he same rule of immunity should apply to arbitrators as applies to the judiciary, inasmuch as the
same reasons of public policy are applicable."), affd, 165 N.Y.S.2d 717 (App. Div. 1957); Nolan &
Abrams, supra note 5, at 238 ("[W]here the arbitrator functions in a way comparable to a judge, the
arbitrator's immunity will extend as far as a judge's."); cf. Moore, 871 P.2d at 217 ("[Tlhe differences that exist between arbitration and court proceedings do not warrant affording an arbitrator less
protection than that conferred upon a judge.").
42. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 522.
43. See id. at 541-42. The Pulliam case has received considerable academic attention. See,
e.g., Joseph R. Weisberger, The Twilight of JudicialIndependence - Pulliam v. Allen, 19 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 537 (1985); Peter E. Glick, Comment, Pulliam's Pacific Progeny: Deep Pockets in the
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Pulliam involved an action against a state magistrate." The plaintiffs asserted that the magistrate's practice of imposing bail on persons arrested for
non-jailable offenses, and incarcerating them if they failed to make bail, was
unconstitutional. 4 The district court enjoined the practice and awarded costs
and attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs,47 and the Fourth Circuit affirmed that ruling
on appeal.48
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the propriety of the dis49
trict court's award of attorneys' fees. However, the Court began by addressing
the more fundamental question of whether the magistrate was immune from the
plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief,50 even though the magistrate herself had
51
not challenged the district court's ruling on that issue, because the fee award
was clearly unwarranted if the magistrate was immune from the underlying sub2
stantive relief on which the award was premised.
The Court began its analysis by noting that although "there was no such
53
thing as an injunction against a judge" at common law (and thus no need to
54
immunize judges from such relief), the judicial immunity doctrine was influenced in large part by the common law tradition of judicial oversight over infeJudges Robes?, 17 PAC. L.J. 461 (1986); Noto, supra note 18; Jeffrey A. Zaluda, Note, Pulliam v.
Allen: Harmonizing JudicialAccountabilityfor Civil Rights Abuses With JudicialImmunity, 34 AM.
U. L. REV. 523 (1985).
44. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Tex., 551 F.2d 1026, 1033, modified, 559
F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1977). The principle underlying this presumption is that an immunity doctrine
that is derivative of judicial immunity "should be at most no broader than the judicial immunity from
which it is derived." Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435, 438 (10th Cir. 1983) (construing prosecutorial
immunity).
45. See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 524.
46. See id. at 524-25.
47. See id. at 525.
48. See Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1982), affid sub nom. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 522.
49. See Pulliam,466 U.S. at 527.
50. See id. at 527-28.
51. See id. at 542 & n.22.
52. See id. at 528. The Court relied on one of its procedural rules permitting it to consider a
"subsidiary question fairly included" within a question upon which certiorari has been granted,
noting that "[tihe question whether judicial immunity should have barred the injunctive relief
awarded [was] 'fairly included' in the question" of whether the magistrate was immune from the
attorneys' fee award. Id. at 528 n.5 (quoting SUP. CT. R. 21.1(a) (current version at SUP. CT. R.
14.1 (a))).
53. Id. at 529.
54. See Wightman, 809 F. Supp. at 477 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court first noted that at common law
there was no such thing as an injunction against a judge; hence there was no discussion in the common law regarding judicial immunity from injunctions.").
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rior tribunals.55 The Court referred in particular to the medieval English practice
"inwhich a judge of the King's Bench, by issuing a writ of prohibition at the
request of a party before an inferior or rival court, enjoined that court from proceeding with a trial or from committing a perceived error during the course of
56
that trial.

Extending this analysis to the relationship between state and federal
judges,57 the Court held that the state magistrate was not immune from the injunctive relief awarded against her. 8 While acknowledging that the analogy it
was drawing was inexact,5 9 the Court noted that no federal appellate court had
ever held that judges are immune from claims for injunctive relief,6° and that
several federal courts had concluded that there is no immunity from such relief.6'
The existence of this precedent, the Court asserted, is no mere coincidence:
To the extent that we rely on the common-law practice in shaping our own
doctrine of judicial immunity, the control exercised by the King's Bench
through the prerogative writs is highly relevant. It indicates that, at least in the
view of the common law, there was no inconsistency between a principle of
immunity that protected judicial authority

. . .

and the availability of collateral

injunctive relief in exceptional cases.62

55. See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 532-33. For a summary of the development of judicial immunity
under the English common law, see Glick, supra note 43, at 463-67.
56. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 533; see also Herrmann v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 432 F. Supp. 236,
239 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (discussing the common law writs used as a "means of exercising control by
the King's Bench over inferior courts").
57. In essence, the Pulliam Court equated the authority of federal courts to enjoin state court
judges "with the ability of superior courts to exercise control over inferior courts at common law."
Page v. Grady, 788 F. Supp. 1207, 1211 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (construing Pulliam); see also Wightman, 809 F. Supp. at 477 ("The Supreme Court then analogized the relationship between the King's
Bench and its rival and inferior courts to the relationship between the federal courts and the state
courts in our current system.").
58. See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 541-42.
59. See id. at 535 ("The relationship between the King's Bench and its collateral and inferior
courts is not precisely paralleled in our system by the relationship between the state and federal
courts."); see also Stephens v. Herring, 827 F. Supp. 359, 364 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("[T]he analogy
drawn in Pulliam between the prerogative writs issued by the King's Bench to inferior and rival
courts and the injunctions issued by federal courts to state judges ...[is] perhaps imperfect ....).
See generally Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293 (2003) ("[O]ur system of parallel state and federal courts is unusual in a federalism, to put it mildly.").
60. See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 537. But see Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 550 F. Supp. 681,
684 (W.D. Okla. 1980) ("There is a split of authority concerning whether judicial immunity shields
judges from actions seeking only injunctive relief.").
61. See Pulliam,466 U.S. at 537. But cf Zimmerman v. Spears, 428 F. Supp. 759, 761 (W.D.
Tex.) ("The doctrine of judicial immunity applies to a proceeding in which injunctive or other equitable relief is sought, as well as to suits for money damages."), aff'd, 565 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977).
62. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 536.
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B. A Limited Exception: FederalJudges May Be Immune From Equitable
Claims
63
In Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, a divided panel of the Ninth
Circuit recognized a limited exception to the Pulliam rule,' the court held that
65
the immunity available to federal judges is not limited to damages, but also
66
The
extends to claims for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief.
court based this extension of judicial immunity beyond that available to state
court judges on its belief that allowing federal courts to enjoin federal judges
would impede the orderly administration of justice by permitting "a 'horizontal
even a 'reverse review' of a ruling
appeal' from one district court to another 6or
7
of the court of appeals by a district court.

63. Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1987).
64. Id. The analysis in Pulliam has not been universally accepted. See Cooney v. Park
County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1336 (Wyo. 1990) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (asserting that Pulliam "has
provided a continuing firestorm particularly among the membership of the federal bench"), vacated
sub nom. Cooney v. White, 501 U.S. 1201 (1991); Chief Admin. Justice of Trial Ct. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 533 N.E.2d 1313, 1317 n.4 (Mass. 1989) ("We have never accepted ... the distinction made in the Pulliam case between a judge's absolute immunity from liability for damages when
acting in a judicial capacity and a judge's lack of absolute immunity in an action for injunctive relief
.... one state court judge predicted that Pulliam might "signal the twilight of judicial
"). Indeed,
.
independence" by exposing judges "to a wide range of harassing and vexatious litigation." Weisberger, supra note 43, at 554, 558; see also Noto, supra note 18, at 834 ("[T]he Court's decision in
Pulliam v. Allen ... may impose upon state judges a burden that the common law doctrine was
designed to prevent.").
65. The Ninth Circuit has observed "federal judges, like state judges, enjoy an absolute common law immunity from civil liability for acts committed in their official capacity." United States v.
Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1984). In this regard, Pulliam "did not overrule the settled
principle that judges are immune from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
capacity." Sunn v. Dean, 597 F. Supp. 79, 83 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (emphasis added).
66. See Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1394; see also Atkinson-Baker & Assocs., Inc. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d
1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Federal judges are absolutely immune from claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief arising from their judicial acts."); Gartner v. SEC, 913 F. Supp. 1372, 1379 (C.D.
Cal. 1995) ("Judicial immunity... bars declaratory and injunctive relief against federal judges ...
.1').

67. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1392-93; cf. Stephens, 827 F. Supp. at 362 ("[I]n the context of our
federal system, while Pulliam's rationale may permit a federal court to enjoin the.., conduct of a
state court judge, it does not, for reasons of policy and jurisdictional power, permit a federal court to
enjoin the conduct of a co-equal or superior federal tribunal.").
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Although other courts have reached the same conclusion,68 the analysis in
these cases has been questioned, 69 not least by the dissenting judge in Mullis
itself,7" who asserted that the majority in that case misread Pulliam,7 and that
there is no basis for distinguishing between state and federal judges for immunity purposes. 2 In any event, the immunity from equitable claims recognized in
Mullis and its progeny is limited to federal judges." Even in the Ninth Circuit,74
76
state court judges, at least," continue to enjoy immunity from damages only.

68. See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Most ...courts [that have
addressed the issue] have held that the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity serves to protect federal judges from injunctive relief as well as money damages."); Hale v. Lefkow, 239 F. Supp. 2d
842, 845 (C.D. Ill.
2003) ("Several courts ... have found federal judges absolutely immune from
equitable relief ....
").
69. See, e.g., Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376, 378 (7th Cir. 1989) (asserting that Mullis
"carves an exception to Pulliam ...of doubtful merit"), abrogatedon other grounds in Antoine
v.
Byer & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993); Church of Scientology Int'l v. Kolts, 846 F. Supp. 873,
885 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (finding Mullis to be binding precedent "on the specific issue of absolute
immunity for federal judicial officers," even though the case may have been "wrongly decided in
light of policy and dicta found in the Pulliam case").
70. See Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1241 (noting that "the dissent in Mullis [took] an opposing position").
71. See Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1394 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
cf Weisberger, supra note 43, at 558 (asserting that reading Pulliam in conjunction with prior Supreme Court precedent "leads to the conclusion that injunctive relief could be awarded against a
federal magistrate or judge") (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).
72. See Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1395 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit has joined the Ninth Circuit in providing "different immunities
for federal and state judges." Bryan v. Murphy, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1378 (citing Bolin, 225 F.3d
at 1239-42), reconsiderationdenied, 246 F. Supp. 1256 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
73. See Scruggs, 870 F.2d at 378 (asserting that the immunity from claims for equitable relief
recognized in Mullis only applies in "cases where the defendant is a federal judge rather than a state
one"); Bayliss v. Madden, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1290 (D. Or. 2001) (relying on Pulliam in holding
that a federal administrative law judge was "not immune from an action for declaratory relief,"
despite the immunity from such claims extended to federal judges in Mullis).
74. In several cases decided after Mullis, courts in the Ninth Circuit have confirmed that state
court judges "are not immune from. . . claims for prospective relief." Lebbos v. Judges of Superior
Court, 883 F.2d 810, 813 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Root v. Schenk, 953 F. Supp. 1115, 1119
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (observing that "state judicial officers do not enjoy the same type of judicial immunity for injunctive relief as federal judges").
75. In some jurisdictions, even federal judges remain subject to the possibility of claims for
equitable relief. See Kampfer v. Scullin, 989 F. Supp. 194, 201 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[Sjome courts
have also held that the Pulliam exception to absolute judicial immunity applie[s] to ...actions
against federal judges."). The Seventh Circuit, for example, "has not yet determined if the doctrine
of absolute judicial immunity protects federal judges from injunctive relief as well as money damages." Hale v. Lefrow, 239 F. Supp. 2d 842, 845 (C.D. II. 2003); see also Weisberger, supra note
43, at 558 ("Pulliammay darken the horizon not only of state but federal judges as well.").
76. See Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Mullis and
Pulliam); see also Moreno v. Cal., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("State judges are
immune from suit for money damages, but may be subject to suit for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief."); Church of Scientology, 846 F. Supp. at 885 n.10 ("It is... established that judicial
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IV.

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE EQUITABLE EXCEPTION IN ARBITRAL
IMMUNITY CASES

A. The View That ArbitratorsAre Not Immune From Equitable Claims
Under the foregoing analysis, arbitrators also presumably remain subject to
77
claims for declaratory, injunctive, and other equitable relief. Insofar as their
relationship to courts considering challenges to their jurisdiction or to the validity of their awards is concerned, arbitrators are analogous to lower courts."
Thus, the prospect of enjoining an arbitrator does not implicate the principal
systemic concern - the imposition of equitable relief upon a court "of equal
stature in the same court system"79 - that led the Ninth Circuit and other courts
80
to immunize federal judges from claims for equitable relief.

immunity does not bar declaratory or injunctive relief in actions against state judges .... ") (citing
Pulliam).
77. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 245 n.97 (asserting that "arbitrators, like judges, are
theoretically subject to injunctive or declaratory relief' under Pulliam); cf. United Food & Commercial Workers, 138 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2918 ("Arbitral immunity is an outgrowth of the doctrine...
which limits judicial liability for damages resulting from judicial decisions.") (emphasis added).
78. See Council of Sch. Officers v. Vaughn, 553 A.2d 1222, 1227 n.l I (D.C. 1989) (noting
that the "role of arbitrator [is] analogous to that of trial judge in appellate proceedings") (citing Sys.
Fed'n, No. 30, Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Braidwood, 284 F. Supp. 607, 610-11 (N.D. Ill. 1968));
Attorney Gen. v. Morgan, 565 A.2d 1072, 1074 (N.H. 1989) (referring to an arbitrator "acting in his
capacity as a trial judge").
79. Stephens, 827 F. Supp. at 364; cf. TCF Film Corp. v. Gourley, 240 F.2d 711, 713 (3rd Cir.
1957) (observing that "judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same court and in the same
case should not overrule the decisions of each other"); Bojas-Gutierrez v. Hoy, 161 F. Supp. 448,
450 (S.D. Cal. 1958) ("For judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction to presume to overrule one another
usually adds only unseemly conflict and confusion where certainty and predictability are most to be
desired."); aftd, 267 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1959).
80. See Stephens, 827 F. Supp. at 364-65 (asserting that the judicial immunity doctrine "cannot be interpreted to permit... an untenable system of 'horizontal appeals' and 'reverse review' of
federal court judgments") (quoting Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1292-93); cf Baier v. Parker, 523 F. Supp.
288, 290 (M.D. La. 1981):
Whatever the plaintiffs have styled their [declaratory judgment] action, plaintiffs' suit is nothing more than a horizontal appeal taken to a district court's decision and of a decision rendered by an appellate court. Such attempts to deliberately bypass the proper channels for appellate review shall not be tolerated or condoned ....
Id.
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This conclusion is bolstered by the immunity provision contained in the
Uniform Arbitration Act."' That provision immunizes arbitrators to the same
extent as state court judges who,82 based on the debatable premise that they are
"inferior" to their federal counterparts," "are not immune from federal suits
seeking equitable or declaratory relief."' In addition, the Ninth Circuit, which
was the first federal appellate court to hold that federal judges are immune from
claims for equitable relief,85 specifically held that arbitrators are not immune
from such claims in Kemner v. District Council of Painting and Allied Trades
No. 36.86
The employer in Kemner was a party to a collective bargaining agreement
that created a tiered pair of arbitration committees for the purpose of resolving
disputes between the employer and the union.87 The union invoked this arbitration procedure, 8 claiming that the employer violated the agreement by failing to
make trust fund contributions.89 The employer appeared at hearings before the
81. A substantial majority of states have adopted, in substance, the provisions of the Uniform
Arbitration Act in order "to encourage and facilitate the use of arbitration." Jack B. Anglin Co. v.
Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268 n.2 (Tex. 1992). This objective is "furthered by the recognition and
frustrated by the non-recognition of arbitral immunity." Higdon, 71 S.W.3d at 132.
82. See UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 14(a) (2000), 7 U.L.A. 31 (Supp. 2004) ("An arbitrator...acting in that capacity is immune from civil liability to the same extent as a judge of a court of
this State acting in a judicial capacity."). For an academic discussion of the Uniform Arbitration
Act, see Francis J. Pavetti, Why the States Should Enact the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 3
PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 443 (2003).
83. Compare Weisberger, supra note 43, at 549 ("[U]ntil the Pulliam opinion, the relationship
between state and federal courts [had] never been described as one of a superior court toward an
inferior one.") with Stephens, 827 F. Supp. at 364 ("[A]lthough the state courts in our federal system
are not 'inferior' to the federal courts, the decisions of state courts are subject to federal review in
matters involving federally protected rights, and, under limited circumstances, are also subject to
federal court injunctions.") (citations omitted).
84. Crane v. Tex., 759 F.2d 412, 421 n.11,modified on other grounds, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.
1985); see also T.W. v. Brophy, 954 F. Supp. 1306, 1311 (E.D. Wis. 1996) ("Pulliam allows a
federal court to enjoin a state court judge in certain circumstances...."); Battle v. Whitehurst, 831 F.
Supp. 522, 528 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("The doctrine of judicial immunity does not insulate state court
judges from claims for injunctive relief....").
85. See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000) (discussing Mullis); see also
Wightman, 809 F. Supp. at 476 ("While two circuit court decisions have addressed this issue, only
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mullis...gave this issue substantial consideration.").
86. Kemner v. District Council of Painting and Allied Trades No. 36, 768 F.2d 1115, 1119-20
(9th Cir. 1985). Another federal appellate court reached a similar conclusion with respect to mediators. See Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1251-52 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (relying on Pulliam in holding
that a claim for injunctive relief against a court-appointed mediator was "not barred by judicial
immunity"); cf Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n v. Office & Prof'l Employees Int'l Union,
Local 2, 947 F. Supp. 540, 545 (D.C. 1996) (indicating that "quasi-judicial immunity...applies to
arbitrators and mediators") (emphasis added).
87. Kemner, 768 F.2d at 1117.
88. Grievance and arbitration provisions are "a standard feature of almost all collective bargaining agreements." Antol v. Esposto, 100 F.3d 1111, 1121 (3d Cir. 1996).
89. Kemner, 768 F.2d at 1117.
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arbitration committees and objected to the committees' proceedings, 90 arguing
that the union's grievance raised matters that were not covered by the collective
bargaining agreement. 9'
When the arbitration committees ultimately concluded that the employer
was liable for unpaid trust fund contributions,92 the employer brought suit to
vacate the committees' award under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 93 arguing that the committees had exceeded their authority under the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.94 The employer named as defendants both the union and the arbitration committees.95 The defendants then
moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing among other things that the arbitrators
were immune from suit, and the district court granted the defendants' motion
without discussion.96

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in
concluding that the arbitration committees were immune from suit.97 Although
the Ninth Circuit has recognized that arbitrators are "immune from civil liability
for acts within their jurisdiction arising out of their arbitral functions in contrac-

90. The Ninth Circuit imposes upon a party opposing arbitration "an affirmative obligation to
present to the arbitrator any arguments why the arbitration should not proceed." United Steelworkers of Am. v. Smoke-Craft, Inc., 652 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981). However, the arbitrability of
a dispute is ultimately "a matter for the courts to determine." Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n,
Local No. 252 v. Standard Sheet Metal, Inc., 699 F.2d 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1983).
91. Kemner, 768 F.2d at 1117.
92. Id.at 1118.
93. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000). Section 301 establishes federal jurisdiction over "[sluits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U.S.C § 185(a). The
provision has been interpreted to provide "a basis for federal question jurisdiction over actions
to...vacate arbitration awards." Carter v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 2004);
see also Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Int'l Union, United Plant Guard Workers of Am., 47 F.3d 14,
16 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act...provides [federal]
subject matter jurisdiction for an action to vacate an arbitration award.") (citation omitted).
94. Kemner, 768 F.2d at 1118; cf Leed Architectural Prods., Inc. v. United Steelworkers of
Am., Local 6677, 916 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1990) ("An arbitrator's authority to settle disputes under a
collective bargaining agreement is contractual in nature, and is limited to the powers that the agreement confers.").
95. Kemner, 768 F.2d at 1117; cf. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 247 (noting that the
language of Section 301 "could refer to any suit arising out of a contract between an employer and a
labor organization, in which case an arbitrator conceivably could...be sued in federal court for breach
of the agreement.").
96. Kemner, 768 F.2d at 1117.
97. Id.at 1120.
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tually agreed upon arbitration hearings," 98 the Kemner court refused to extend

this immunity to claims for equitable relief:
[The employer] has sued only for relief from those acts allegedly taken in
excess of the committees' jurisdiction, not for damages against the committees
or any individual. Section 301 confers jurisdiction on the courts to determine
such issues, and the policy concerns underlying the doctrines of judicial and
arbitral immunity from damages actions do not obtain. 99
This is also the conclusion reached by a federal district court in TWA, Inc. v.
Sinicropi.' ° That case involved an employer's suit to vacate a retirement
When the board
board's decision to award benefits to a former employee.'
members were initially split over whether the employee was entitled to benefits,
an impartial referee was appointed'0 2 in accordance with the terms of the retirement plan to break the deadlock. 103
When the referee subsequently sided with the board members who favored
awarding benefits to the employee,' °4 the employer brought suit against those
board members, the referee, the employee, and his union'0 5 seeking equitable
relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA").10 6 In particular, the employer asked the court to vacate the board's
decision on the ground that the board had exceeded its authority under the terms
of the plan. 0 7

98. Wasyl, 813 F.2d at 1582; see also Cort v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 795 F. Supp. 970, 971
(N.D. Cal. 1992) ("Ninth Circuit...courts have generally recognized that the doctrine of judicial
immunity is applicable to the arbitration process.").
99. Kemner, 768 F.2d at 1119-20 (citation omitted); see also Falkner v. Blanton, 419 U.S.
977, 977 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (observing that two other federal
appellate courts "have concluded that the reasons for immunity in damage actions are inapplicable
when injunctions or declaratory judgments are sought") (citing cases).
100. Sinicropi, 1994 WL 132233.
101. Seeid.at*l.
102. The appointed referee is a prominent arbitrator who has written a number of respected
articles and treatises on arbitration, including MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI,
EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1987) and MARIvN F. HELL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI,
REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1990).
103. See Sinicropi, 1994 WL 132233 at *1.
104. The referee actually drafted the opinion that became the board's decision. See id at 60102.
105. Seeid. at600,*1.
106. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1996).
107. See Sinicropi, 1994 WL 132233 at *1. Section 502(a) of ERISA authorizes a beneficiary
of a covered plan to bring suit for injunctive or other equitable relief to enforce the terms of the plan
or to redress any violations of ERISA or the terms of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3); see also
Murphy v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 850 F. Supp. 1367, 1373 (C.D. IlI. 1994) ("ERISA provides
a private right of action to any beneficiary or participant to enforce the terms of either a pension or a
welfare benefit plan."), af'd,61 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 1995).
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The referee then moved to dismiss the employer's claim against him, °8 arguing that, as an impartial arbitrator he was "functionally comparable" to a
judge,0 9 and therefore immune from suit."0 However, the employer, who was
not seeking monetary relief from the referee or any of the other defendants,"'
responded that although arbitrators may be immune from damage awards, they
are not immune from awards of prospective equitable relief.12
The court agreed with the employer, noting that the case on which the referee was relying to support his contrary contention, International Union, United
Automobile Workers of America v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 3 had specifically
reserved judgment on the issue." 4 Relying instead on Pulliam v. Allen," 5 the
Sinicropi court held, as a matter of law, that arbitral immunity does not shield an
arbitrator from a claim for equitable relief," 6 and therefore refused to dismiss
the employer's claim against the referee." 7
108. It is not clear why the board members named as defendants did not join in this motion,
since they would appear to be no less entitled to immunity than the referee. See I. & F. Corp., 493
F. Supp. at 149 (holding that even members of dispute resolution boards who are "vitally interested
in the matters before them" may be protected by arbitral immunity, because "it is not arbitration per
se that federal policy favors, but rather final adjustment of differences by a means selected by the
parties").
109. See Sinicropi, 1994 WL 132233 at *1. This argument was premised upon the Supreme
Court's indication, in Butz, 438 U.S. at 478, that it is appropriate to extend immunity to non-judicial
officers acting in a capacity "functionally comparable to that of a judge." id. at 513 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. See id. at * 1; cf Corey, 691 F.2d at 1209-10 (noting that other courts "have applied in
substance a functional comparability test and accorded arbitrators immunity for acts arising out of
the scope of their arbitral functions").
111. See Sinicropi, 1994 WL 132233 at **1-2.
112. See id. at *l.
113. United Auto. Workers, 701 F.2d at 1181.
114. See Sinicropi, 1994 WL 132223 at *2 ("United Automobile Workers is not to the contrary.
In concluding that the arbitrator was entitled to immunity from liability for damages, the court declined to address whether the doctrine of arbitral immunity would bar an action for equitable relief.")
(citing United Auto. Workers, 701 F.2d at 1187 n.10); cf. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 250:
Greyhound is not so strong an extension of arbitral immunity ... as it might appear. One of the
three panel members opposed reaching the immunity issue, and even the majority reserved the
question of whether a plaintiff could maintain an action against an arbitrator for equitable relief, as
opposed to damages.
(Footnotes omitted.)
115. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 522.
116. See Sinicropi, 1994 WL 132233 at *2.
117. See id. at *3. The referee subsequently moved for reconsideration of this ruling, but the
court found it unnecessary to rule on the motion because the referee and the other defendants were
awarded summary judgment on other grounds. See Sincropi, 887 F. Supp. at 602 n.5.
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B. The View That ArbitratorsAre Immune From Claimsfor Equitable Relief

An opposing view was expressed in Tamari v. Conrad,"' one of the seminal
federal court decisions addressing the scope of the arbitral immunity doctrine." 9
Tamari involved a claim for declaratory relief brought by commodity futures
investors"' against a panel of arbitrators selected to arbitrate a dispute between
the investors and their broker. 2 ' The investors asserted that the panel was improperly constituted, 122 and requested an injunction prohibiting any further arbitration proceedings, as well as a declaration that any award issued by the panel
was void. 123 The investors named only the panel members as defendants, although the broker was subsequently permitted to intervene in order to protect its
own interests. 12A
The district court dismissed the action on the ground that arbitrators are
immune from suits challenging their authority to resolve disputes, 125 and the
investors appealed.'26 The investors argued that the principal rationale for immunizing arbitrators from claims for monetary relief - the presumption that "an
arbitrator cannot impartially resolve a dispute unless he is free from the fear of
- does not apply in cases that only involve
reprisal by a dissatisfied litigant"
27
claims for equitable relief.1
28
Although that argument is supported by the analysis in Pulliam v. Allen
(which had not been decided when Tamari arose)

129

and other Supreme Court

118. Tamari,552 F.2d at 778.
119. Tamari was the first reported case holding that "immunity attaches even where a litigant
calls into question the arbitrator's jurisdiction." Raitport v. Provident Nat. Bank, 451 F. Supp. 522,
527 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Prior to that time, "[c]ases in which courts ... clothed arbitrators with immunity [had] involved disgruntled litigants who sought to hold an arbitrator liable for alleged misconduct in arriving at a decision." Baar,211 Cal. Rptr. at 428; see also Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5,
at 240 (describing Tamari as a "leading case" on arbitral immunity).
120. Commodity futures trading "involves the purchase and sale of contracts for delivery at
some future date of specific quantities of a given commodity at fixed prices." Ping He (Hai Nam)
Co. v. Nonferrous Metals (U.S.A.) Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 94, 102 n. I (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated in part
on other grounds, 187 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). For a comprehensive discussion of commodity
futures trading, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 356-67
(1982).
121. See Tamari, 552 F.2d at 779-80.
122. In particular, the investors claimed that "the selection and composition of the arbi' -ation
panel violated the terms of the [parties'] agreement to arbitrate as well as the rules of the Chicago
Board of Trade." Id. at 780.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 779.
126. See id. at 780.
127. See Tamari, 552 F.2d at 780; cf Guerin v. Riley, 573 F. Supp. 110, 111 (D.N.J. 1983)
("[T]he decision not to extend immunity to. .. suits for equitable relief is supported by the reasoning
which underlies the principles of judicial immunity.").
128. Pulliam,466 U.S. at 522.

340
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precedent, 3 ' the Seventh Circuit held that arbitral immunity extends to cases in
which the plaintiff is only challenging the arbitrator's authority to resolve the
parties' dispute.' 3 ' The court reasoned that arbitrators have no direct interest in
the outcome of such cases, 3 2 and will be unlikely to agree to arbitrate disputes if
they can be "caught up in the struggle between the litigants and saddled with the
burdens of defending a lawsuit."' 33
In Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal & Musso, P.A. v. MedPartners,Inc.,1 4 a federal district court relied on Tamari in holding that arbitrators are immune from claims for injunctive relief,'35 despite acknowledging the
existence of prior case law holding that arbitral immunity does not shield arbitrators from claims for equitable relief.' 36 The Brandon court noted that arbitrators are not necessary parties to actions challenging their awards because those
awards are subject to federal judicial review by means of a motion to modify or
vacate the award.' 37
The court also noted that, as a policy matter, permitting suits against arbitrators "threatens to scuttle the efficacy of arbitration and to intimidate the [arbitra129. In particular, the Pulliam Court's refusal to immunize state court judges from claims for
equitable relief was based, in part, upon its conclusion that "the absence of immunity from prospective injunctive relief ... had not chilled judicial independence." Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1241 (discussing
Pulliam).
130. See Falkner,419 U.S. at 978 (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("I assume
that subjecting judges to damage liability would discourage vigor and independence of the bench,
yet there need be no fear that subjecting judges to equitable relief... will inhibit desirable judicial
behavior.").
131. See Tamari,552 F.2d at 780.
132. See id. at 781. The court also noted that the investors could challenge the arbitration
panel's authority by bringing an action against their "real adversary" -- the broker -- to have the
panel's award set aside. Id.; see also Raitport, 451 F. Supp. at 527 (concluding that "arbitrators'
immunity does not deprive [the plaintiff] of a remedy for any wrong he may have suffered; it simply
requires that he pursue his remedies against . . . his real adversary") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Tamari).
133. Tamari, 552 F.2d at 781; see also Bernard Dobranski, The Arbitrator As a Fiduciary
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: A MisguidedApproach, 32 AM. U. L.
REV. 65, 84 (1982) ("An arbitrator cannot be expected to decide ... disputes if he may be saddled
with the burden of defending his decision in a law suit. Arbitrators, especially the most experienced
and knowledgeable ones, will not accept appointment in such cases.").
134. Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal & Musso, P.A. v. MedPartners, 203 F.R.D.
677 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff'd in part and dismissed in part,312 F.3d 1349 (11 th Cir. 2002).
135. Id. at 688 & n.10.
136. Id. at 689.
137. Id. at 688; cf Corey, 691 F.2d at 1210 ("Although the scope of review differs slightly, the
same protection is present in judicial review of arbitrators' decisions ... as is present in the review
of judicial or administrative decisions.").
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tion] panel from adjudicating the dispute."1 3' The court went on to conclude
that, in assessing this threat, there is no meaningful distinction between damage
claims and claims for equitable relief, 39 and thus no persuasive policy reason for
refusing to extend arbitral immunity to claims for equitable relief'"
The same result was reached in Prudential Bache-Securities Ltd. v. National Association of Securities Dealers Dispute Resolution, Inc. 1 Prudential
Bache-Securities arose out of an arbitration commenced by an investor against
three affiliated brokerage firms with whom he maintained investment accounts. 42 The investor claimed that a stockbroker employed by one of the firms
had engaged in numerous unauthorized transactions on his behalf as part of a
"churning" scheme to increase the stockbroker's commissions. 43
Two of the brokerage firms, who were not parties to the account agreement
under which the investor was seeking arbitration,' 44 filed suit to enjoin the arbitration panel from proceeding with the arbitration. 45 The panel moved to dismiss the claim,'" indicating that it would abide by any court order concerning
the firms' obligation to arbitrate.' 47 The brokerage firms opposed the motion,

138. Brandon, 203 F.R.D. at 688; cf. Blue Cross, 114 S.W.3d at 133 ("[F]reedom from the
threat of lawsuits initiated by dissatisfied parties [is] essential to the success of the arbitration process.").
139. Brandon, 203 F.R.D. at 689 (characterizing the difference between damage claims and
claims for equitable relief as "a distinction without a difference"); cf. Jordan v. Haw. Gov't Employees Ass'n Local 152, 472 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (D. Haw. 1979) ("[lnjunctive relief with its attendant
contempt powers may pose as real a threat to impartial decision-making as a suit for damages.").
But see Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting "the implicit assumption
that the burden of defending a suit for equitable relief ... is no less than the burden of defending
against personal liability for damages").
140. See Brandon, 203 F.R.D. at 689; cf. Star Distribs., Ltd. v. Marino, 613 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir.
1980) ("[Tlhe justification for.. .immunity against injunctive relief, while somewhat different from
that for immunity for damages, is no less compelling.").
141. Prudential Bache-Securities Ltd. v. National Association of Securities Dealers Dispute
Resolution, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
142. Id. at 439-40.
143. Id. at 439.
144. Id. Each of the investor's account agreements contained a different dispute resolution
procedure, and the investor invoked only one of them. Id.
145. Id. Even though the firms had not agreed to the pertinent arbitration provision, the arbitration panel had issued an order purporting to compel them to participate in the arbitration the investor
initiated. PrudentialBache, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 439-40.
146. Id. at 439-40. The suit was actually brought against, and the motion to dismiss made by,
the arbitration organization from which the arbitration panel was selected. Id. However, the defendant is characterized here as the arbitration panel for the sake of simplicity in view of the fact that
"organizations that sponsor arbitrations, as well as arbitrators themselves, enjoy... immunity from
civil liability." New Eng. Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 199 F.3d 542, 545 (1st
Cir. 1999).
147. PrudentialBache, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 440.
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arguing that the arbitration panel was subject to suit challenging its jurisdiction
over the parties' dispute. 148
The court granted the panel's motion to dismiss, 149 holding that arbitrators
are immune from claims challenging their jurisdiction. 50 In reaching this result,
the court noted the similarity between arbitral and judicial functions," 1 and specifically held that arbitrators are entitled to the same immunity as federal judges
from suits challenging the exercise of their jurisdiction'52 - meaning, obviously,
' 53
immunity "from injunctive relief as well as money damages.'
V. AN ALTERNATIVE

APPROACH: THE ARBITRATOR Is NOT A NECESSARY PARTY

A. The ArbitratorIs Not the Real Party in Interest
There was no appeal from the district court's ruling in PrudentialBache,154
nor was the propriety of extending arbitral immunity to claims for equitable
relief addressed on appeal in the Brandon case.'55 Thus, apart from Tamari v.
Conrad,'56 there is no federal appellate authority explicitly holding that arbitrators are immune from such claims.' 57 However, other federal courts have
148. Id.
149. Id. at441.
150. Id. at 440 ("[T]he Court concludes that arbitrators.. .are immune from suit for jurisdictional determinations made in their capacity as arbitrators.").
151. Id. ("[Tihe nature of the function performed by arbitrators necessitates protection analogous to that traditionally accorded to judges.") (quoting Austern, 898 F.2d at 886).
152. Id. ("[Ilt is appropriate to extend to arbitrators the same immunity that federal courts
currently enjoy from suits based on the wrongful exercise ofjurisdiction.")
153. Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1240.
154. Telephone interview with Terri L. Reicher, Associate General Counsel, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (October 19, 2004). An appeal from the court's immunity ruling
would have been particularly surprising because the court enjoined the investor, who intervened in
the action, from proceeding with the arbitration, and the arbitration panel agreed to abide by that
ruling. See PrudentialBache, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 439-41.
155. Brandon, 312 F.3d at 1359 ("No need exists...to decide whether arbitral immunity protects arbitrators from suits seeking only injunctive relief.").
156. Tamari, 552 F.2d at 778.
157. However, PrudentialBache and Brandon are not the only federal district court decisions
extending arbitral immunity to "challenges to the right of... arbitrators to make any decision in the
case before them." Krecun v. Bakery, Cracker, Pie, Yeast Drivers and Misc. Workers Unions, Local
734, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 586 F. Supp. 545, 550 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (applying Tamari); see also
Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 240-41 ("Although Tamari is one of the very few reported cases
involving a preaward challenge to the arbitrator's jurisdiction, other authority recognizing immunity
form a postaward jurisdictional challenge supports the Tamari holding.").

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2005

19

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 5
reached essentially the same result by holding that arbitrators are not indispenthe validity of their decisions or addressing
sable parties in litigation challenging
58
the arbitrability of a dispute.1
In Honeywell, Inc. v. United Instrument Workers Local No. 116,' for example, an employer sought to compel a union to arbitrate a dispute under the
terms of an expired collective bargaining agreement. 16° The union challenged
the court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute on the ground that the arbitrator
6
was an indispensable party who the employer had failed to join in the action. '
6
2
The court noted that
However, the court rejected the union's argument.
the only question properly before it was whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
the dispute at issue. 63 Because the arbitrator could provide nothing to assist in
resolving this question, 6" the court concluded that he was not an indispensable
party and that his absence from the proceedings did not prejudice the em16
ployer. 16 Finding the union's other arguments to be equally lacking in merit, 6
the court ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration. 67
A similar result was reached, in a different context, in Franklin v. Sandra
Greer Real Estate, Inc. 6 The plaintiff in Franklin challenged the termination
of his employment, which had been upheld in an arbitration conducted in accordance with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between his employer
and the union that represented him. 169 The plaintiff brought suit alleging claims
against (1) the arbitrator for injunctive relief in the form of an order vacating the

158. See generally Caudle v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 230 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2000) ("It is
not clear whether [the applicable] principle is properly understood as an 'immunity' rather than a
conclusion that arbitrators ... are not the real parties in interest.").
159. Honeywell, Inc. v. United Instrument Workers Local No. 116, 307 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.
Pa. 1970).
160. See id. at 1126-28.
161. Id. at 1128.
162. Id. ("The Court concludes that [the union's] contention is without merit").
163. Id.
164. Id.; cf AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communication Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)
("Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.").
165. See Honeywell, 307 F. Supp. at 1128. Ironically, the court did not address the potential
prejudice to the union, who was the party claiming the arbitrator was an indispensable party. However, it seems clear that the union likewise suffered no prejudice from the employer's failure to name
the arbitrator as a party. See generally Int'l Med. Group, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 628 (asserting that
joinder of the arbitrator as a party "is unnecessary to the resolution of any claim directed at determining the propriety of arbitration..."); Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 242 ("Neither side need[s]
the arbitrator as a party .... ").
166. In particular, the court noted that "[aill of the other issues raised [by the union were]
factual questions for the arbitrator to decide." Honeywell, 307 F. Supp. at 1129.
167. Id.
168. Franklin v. Sandra Greer Real Estate, Inc., 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2575 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
169. Id. at 2575-76.
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arbitration award, 17 (2) his former employer for wrongful discharge, and (3) his
union for breach of the duty of fair representation.' 7 '
The arbitrator moved to dismiss the claim asserted against him. 172 Although
7
the plaintiff was seeking to recover damages from the employer and the union, 1
he disclaimed any such intent with respect to the arbitrator. 74 The court held
that, under these circumstances, the arbitrator was not a necessary party to the
action, 175 and because there could be no prejudice to the plaintiff in doing so,
176
granted the arbitrator's motion to dismiss.
Similar reasoning has been applied in other cases. 77 In Aberle Hosiery Co.
v. American Arbitration Association,7 ' for example, a party who had agreed to
purchase certain industrial machinery brought suit to enjoin the seller and an
arbitration association 179 from proceeding with an arbitration that had been initi-

170. Id. at 2576. "The only relief requested by plaintiff which concerns [the arbitrator] is the
demand for an order vacating the arbitrator's award." Id.
171. Id. As the exclusive representative of the employees in a bargaining unit, a union has a
duty to represent the interests of all of those employees fairly and impartially. See Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964). That duty is breached "when a union's conduct toward a member
of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
172. See Franklin, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2575-76.
173. It appears that the plaintiff was, at a minimum, seeking reinstatement to his former position and the recovery of damages attributable to his "loss of pay." Id. at 2576.
174. Id. "The plaintiff, in his memorandum and at oral argument, has specifically denied seeking any monetary damages against [the arbitrator]." Id.
175. Id. ("It is clear that the arbitrator is not a necessary party to an action seeking to set aside
an arbitrator's award") (citing Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in
relevant partand rev'd in part,514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975)).
176. See id. at 2576. "[W]e can see no possible prejudice to the plaintiff resulting from the
granting of the motion to dismiss .... This court has the authority to vacate [the arbitration] award..
. in a suit brought solely against the employer and the local union, as plaintiff has done in this case."
Id.
177. See Howland, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 592 ("The case law is clear that no cause of action can be
asserted against an arbitrator based on the issuance of an unfavorable decision."); cf Higdon, 71
S.W.3d. at 133 ("[D]issatisfaction with the result of an arbitration is not a sufficient ground to overcome an arbitrator's ... immunity.").

178. Aberle Hosiery Co. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 337 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
179. Although "[a]rbitral immunity ordinarily protects the individual arbitrator from liability,"
United States v. City of Haywood, 36 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 1994), the courts have generally held
that this immunity "extends beyond arbitrators themselves to organizations that sponsor arbitrations." Olsons, 85 F.3d at 382. The reasoning underlying this extension of the doctrine is that the
failure to immunize such an organization would "discourage it from sponsoring future arbitrations."
New Eng. CleaningServs., 199 F.3d at 546.
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ated by the seller.' ° The court held that the arbitration association was not a
party to the action' 8' because it had no interest in the outcome of the
necessary
82
matter.
The court also noted that the relief the purchaser sought could be granted
without joining the arbitration association as a defendant,'83 because the arbitration would not proceed if the seller was enjoined from arbitrating the parties'
dispute. 8 4 In this regard, the court was applying a common judicial preference
rather than directly enjoining another trifor enjoining the parties to a dispute,
85
bunal from hearing the dispute.
B. Implications of the Real Party in InterestIssue for ArbitralImmunity
In Thomas v. Consolidation Coal Co.,' 86 the Fourth Circuit noted the relative absence of any contrary authority holding that arbitrators are necessary

180. See Aberle Hosiery, 337 F. Supp. at 91.
181. The issue arose because the seller removed the case from state to federal court on the basis
of diversity of citizenship, and the purchaser then sought a remand to state court on the ground that
the purchaser and the arbitration association were citizens of the same state. See id. at 92; cf. Walker
v. Norwest Corp., 108 F.3d 158, 161 (8th Cir. 1997) ("It is, to say the least, well settled that federal
diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity, so that no defendant is a citizen of the same state
as any plaintiff."). The seller opposed remand, invoking the principle that the citizenship of nominal
or unnecessary parties is to be disregarded in determining the propriety of removal on diversity
grounds. See Aberle Hosiery, 337 F. Supp. at 92; cf. Jakoubek v. Fortico Benefits Ins. Co., 301 F.
Supp. 2d 1045, 1049 (D. Neb. 2003) ("[C]omplete diversity of citizenship ... depends on the citizenship of the real parties to the controversy when the complaint is filed, and not on the citizenship
of nominal parties to the suit with no real substantial legal interest in the controversy.") (citations
omitted).
182. See Aberle Hosiery, 337 F. Supp. at 92; see also Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 241
("The party doubting the arbitrator's jurisdiction can raise the jurisdictional issue in a suit brought
before the hearing against the other party. The arbitrator has no legal interest in the dispute, is not an
essential party, and should therefore have no role in such a suit.").
183. In an effort to confirm this fact, the arbitration association itself indicated that it would
"continue to process [the seller's] claim only until such time as [the seller] is enjoined by the Courts
from proceeding further." Aberle Hosiery, 337 F. Supp. at 92; see also N. Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco
Indus. Gases, Div. of Airco, Inc., 676 F.2d 270, 272 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing another communication from the same association asserting that it was "not a necessary party in judicial proceedings
relating to ... arbitration and should not be named as a party-defendant" because it would "abide by
any court order directed against either party to the arbitration which is binding upon the parties.")
(bracketing omitted).
184. See Aberle Hosiery, 337 F. Supp. at 92.
185. See McKown, 444 S.E.2d. at 115 (noting that Aberle Hosiery and similar cases reflect "a
judicial preference to restrain parties to a controversy rather than restraining the tribunal from hearing the matter"). This preference often manifests itself in a reluctance to enjoin other courts from
proceeding. See, e.g., In re Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17, 23 (lst Cir.
1982) ("[A] court should not enjoin judges from applying statutes when complete relief can be
afforded by enjoining all other parties with the authority to seek relief under the statute.").
186. Thomas v. Consolidation Coal Co., 380 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1967).
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parties to actions in which the validity of their awards is at issue,'87 and asserted
that the law "seems clear that the arbitrator is not a necessary party to such a
'
suit." 188
The consistency of this case law is particularly notable in view of the
split of authority over whether arbitrators are "immune" from such actions," 9
and its legal significance is suggested by the interplay of the two issues in
Wooldridge v. Commonwealth of Virginia.9 0

In Wooldridge, the court dismissed a claim for declaratory relief asserted
against a state official, 9 ' despite acknowledging that his quasi-judicial immunity
from liability for monetary damages 92 did not necessarily shield him from an
award of equitable relief.193 Noting that a refusal to impose declaratory relief on
the official would not prejudice the plaintiff,' 94 the court concluded that it would
serve little purpose to keep the official in the case.'95 Because its jurisdiction

187. See id. at 80 n.17. But cf. Paine v. Lowndes County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 183 S.E.2d
474, 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971) ("In our view an arbitrator would be a necessary party in any proceeding designed to prevent him from acting in the capacity to which he was appointed and had accepted."), disapproved on other grounds in Chancey v. Hancock, 213 S.E.2d 633, 636 (Ga. 1975).
188. Thomas, 380 F.2d at 80 n.17.
189. See supra notes 77-153 and accompanying text.
190. Wooldridge v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 453 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. Va. 1978).
191. The official was the Director of the Virginia Department of Welfare. See id. at 1335.
192. See id. at 1336-37. Due to the nature of their duties, many non-judicial government officials with decision-making authority have been afforded a degree of quasi-judicial or "official"
immunity:
It has been recognized that the threat of civil liability can have a chilling effect on governmental
officials in the proper performance of their duties. Accordingly, various forms of official immunity
have been recognized to insure the independence necessary to protect the decision maker from bias
or intimidation arising out of the exercise of judicial functions.
Cort, 795 F. Supp. at 971-72 (citations omitted).
193. See Wooldridge, 453 F. Supp. at 1337 n.3 ("The dismissal of the action for damages does
not necessarily dispose of plaintiff's prayer for declaratory judgment because judicial and quasijudicial immunity may not extend to suits for declaratory relief."); see also Steven L. Micas, The
Doctrinal Basesfor Absolute and Qualified Public Official Immunities, 29 URB. LAW. 47, 47 n. 1
(1997) ("The public official immunity doctrines do not constitute a bar to prospective injunctive
relief against a public official.").
194. See Wooldridge, 453 F. Supp. at 1337 n.3 ("A declaratory judgment [against the state
official] does not appear to be a necessary predicate for any future action to be undertaken by the
plaintiff.").
195. See id. ("[1]t would serve little purpose to keep [the official] in the suit solely on the
strength of plaintiffs prayer for declaratory relief ....
").
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over the plaintiffs equitable claim was discretionary,' 96 the court dismissed the
state official from the case entirely.'97
The same analysis should apply in cases seeking equitable relief from arbitrators. 198 In suits challenging the validity of arbitration awards or an arbitrator's
authority to act, injunctive relief clearly can be obtained from the real parties in
interest."9 Because that relief should ordinarily be sufficient to protect an aggrieved party's interests,2"0 compelling
the arbitrator to participate in such an
'2 1
action would "serve little purpose. 0
Accordingly, where an arbitrator has been named as a party in a case seeking equitable relief,20 2 the court should, in the interest of judicial and litigant
economy, 20 3 ordinarily exercise its discretion to dismiss the arbitrator as a defendant. 2°4 This sub silentio application of the arbitral immunity doctrine 2 5 can be
summarized in the following terms:

196. See id. ("[Ilit is well established that judicial power to entertain actions solely for declaratory relief is discretionary.") (citing cases).
197. See id. ("[D]efendant... will be wholly dismissed from this action.").
198. See Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. #5 v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. #5 Teachers Ass'n, 324 A.2d 308,
309 n. I (Me. 1974) ("The Arbitrator acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and need not and should not be
designated a party in any procedure to modify or set aside his award."); Weston, supra note 31, at
506 ("If a claim against a provider is really a disguised complaint against the arbitrator's decisional
acts,. . .the provider simply is not the real party in interest - immunity is irrelevant.").
199. See Corey, 691 F.2d at 1211 ("An aggrieved party alleging... lack ofjurisdiction, etc., by
arbitrators should pursue remedies against the 'real' adversary through the appeal process.").
200. See DeVries v. Interstate Motor Freight Sys., 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2764, 2769 (N.D. Ohio
1976) (asserting that the conclusion that an arbitrator was "not a proper party defendant" in an action
challenging the validity of an arbitration award "in no way affects the relief that the plaintiffs may
otherwise be entitled to if they are successful on the merits"), aff'd, 620 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1980);
Independence Dev., Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 416, 423 (Ct. C.P. Bucks
County 1972) ("[T]he relief which plaintiffs seek can be afforded even though [the arbitrator] is not
mentioned as a party; a decree binding upon [the real parties in interest] will be sufficient to prevent
further pursuit of the arbitration process.").
201. Wooldridge, 453 F. Supp. at 1337 n.3.
202. See Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 757 F.2d 676, 691 (5th
Cir. 1985) ("[A]rbitrators are ... likely targets of recriminatory lawsuits by disappointed parties.");
Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 245 (asserting that dissatisfied litigants "might be inclined to
forego damages and sue arbitrators for equitable relief").
203. See Keene v. Rinaldi, 127 F. Supp. 2d 770, 774 (M.D.N.C. 2000) ("[T]he dismissal of
unnecessary parties will promote judicial efficiency.").
204. See, e.g., Shropshire v. Int'l Bhd of Teamsters of Am., 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2751, 2752
(S.D. Ohio 1979) (dismissing claims asserted against arbitrators because they were "immune from
civil suits" and therefore "improper party defendants"). See generally Genovese v. Skol Co., 73 F.
Supp. 423,424 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (noting that a "court in its discretion, can retain jurisdiction of a suit
[while] allowing dismissals as to proper, but not necessary parties").
205. One court has asserted that a finding that an arbitrator "is not a necessary party" to litigation challenging the propriety of arbitration can be "stated otherwise" as a finding that arbitrators
"are protected by arbitral immunity." Int'l Med. Group, Inc., 312 F.3d at 833; see also Shropshire,
102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2752 (stating that arbitrators "are not proper parties to... suit because they
enjoy immunity as arbitrators") (emphasis added); Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 242 (character-
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Occasionally a losing party seeking to challenge an award in court names
the arbitrator as a defendant along with the other party. This is improper. Once
the arbitrator renders an award, his role is finished. The proper challenge to an
award is an action to vacate it brought against the other party, the real adversary,
not against the arbitrator .... [Tlhe arbitrator is not a proper party in a suit over
06
the award and has no interest in the dispute once the award is rendered."
VI.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Kemner v. District Council of Painting & Allied Trades No. 36207 and TWA,
Inc. v. Sinicropi2 8 are the only federal court decisions specifically holding that
2
arbitrators are not immune from claims for equitable relief. " That conclusion
2°
reflects the view that arbitrators and other individuals "who enjoy only quasi21
than judges. '
judicial status, neither need nor can claim an immunity broader
Nevertheless, there is a striking absence of any discussion in either Kemner or
22
Kemner, in particular, has
Sinicropi of any policy reason for this conclusion.

izing the view that "the arbitrator is not a proper party in a suit over the award" as an "application of
arbitral immunity"). See generally Weston, supra note 31, at 457-58 ("[T]he law in various guises
confers substantial protection from civil liability through the doctrine of arbitral immunity.") (emphasis added).
206. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 242 (footnotes omitted).
207. Kemner, 768 F.2d at 1115.
208. Sinicropi, 1994 WL 132233.
209. However, in Durden, the court suggested its agreement with the analysis in Kemner and
Sinicropi by observing that "[airbitral immunity shields an arbitrator only from claims for damages,"
despite leaving open "the propriety of [naming] the arbitrator as a defendant for the purpose of
vacating . . . [an] award." Durden v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2262, 2263 n.1
(N.D. Ga. 1985).
210. See Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 218 F.3d at 1090 ("[T]he arbitrator plays a quasi-judicial
role."); Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that "arbitrators act in
a quasi-judicial capacity"); John W. Johnson, Inc. v. Basic Constr. Co., 292 F. Supp. 300, 302
(D.D.C. 1968) ("The arbitrator's acts are somewhat analogous to a quasi-judicial process.").
211. Rouselle v. Perez, 293 F. Supp. 298, 300 (E.D. La. 1968); see also Anderson v. N.Y. State
Div. of Parole, 546 F. Supp. 816, 825-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (questioning whether persons who "may
not enjoy the independence of the true judiciary, should be accorded an immunity equally broad in
scope").
212. Sinicropi contains no discussion whatsoever of the policies underlying arbitral immunity,
and the court in Kemner merely asserted, without elaboration, that those policies "do not obtain" in
actions for equitable relief. Kemner, 768 F.2d at 1120.
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been criticized on this basis,213 as well as for failing to consider the alternative
real party in interest issue.214
The reason ordinarily advanced for refusing to interpret the various immunity doctrines to preclude claims for equitable relief stems from the view that
decision-makers, whether judges or arbitrators,2" 5 need only be free from "the
fear of adverse 'personal consequences"' to maintain the impartiality necessary
to the proper performance of their duties. 2" 6 Immunity from claims for declaratory or injunctive relief is unnecessary, this reasoning goes, because relief of this
nature "does not visit 'personal consequences' upon the defendant," but instead
merely "affects an individual in the conduct of his or her official duties."2 7 As
one commentator explained:
[A]n injunction.., does not threaten a judge in the same way as an action
for damages which the judge may have to pay out of personal funds. Injunctive
relief, then, does not pose the same kind of risk to the judiciary as other forms of
liability,
and therefore, it is not necessary to use judicial immunity to interdict
2 Is
it.

213. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 237-38 (criticizing the "brief discussion" of arbitral
immunity in Kemner, and predicting that "[more thoughtful courts" will find the Ninth Circuit's
analysis in that case unpersuasive).
214. See id. at 237-38 ("The Kemner court seemed to confuse an action to vacate an award
brought against the other party with an action brought against the arbitrator. The allegations were
sufficient to state a cause of action against the other party, but not against the arbitrator.").
215. See L & H Airco, Inc., 446 N.W.2d at376 ("Arbitrators must be protected from the harassment of personal suits brought against them by dissatisfied parties so that, like judges, they are
able to 'act upon their convictions free from the apprehensions of possible consequences."') (quoting
Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 72 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Minn. 1955)).
216. Adams v. Super. Ct. of Pa., 502 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (quoting Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978)); see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 688 F. Supp. 1522, 1525 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
The immunity doctrines are premised on the concern that the threat of personal liability will thwart
the officials' ability to carry out their duties with the decisiveness and good faith judgment required.
The immunity doctrines, therefore, do not protect officials when they are not threatened with personal liability, such as when a complaint seeks injunctive relief.
(Footnotes omitted).
217. Adams, 502 F. Supp. at 1286; see also Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305, 311 (D.R.I.
1973) ("A preventive remedy does not shackle a judge in the performance of his duties by fear of
personal consequences."), vacated, 420 U.S. 904 (1975); cf. Spencer v. Holesinger, 693 F. Supp.
703, 712 (C.D. I11.1988) ("[Ilnjunctive relief is much less intrusive than relief in the form of damages in terms of restricting ...
decision making").
218. Jeffrey R. Shaman, JudicialImmunity From Civil and CriminalLiability, 27 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1, 14 (1990); see also Hogge v. Hedrick, 391 F. Supp. 91, 96 (E.D. Va. 1975) ("The chilling
effect on decision making occasioned by suits for monetary damages ... is not present when equitable relief is sought ....); cf Guerin, 573 F. Supp. at 112 ("[E]xposure in equity poses no more
danger to the independence and impartiality of ...decision-making than does the possibility of
reversal.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Whatever merit this reasoning may have in the context of judicial immunity," 9 it ignores the fact that unlike judges, 220 arbitrators are typically compensated directly for the services they provide,22 ' and thus have an interest in maximizing the number of cases they hear.222 Accordingly, the possibility of being
enjoined from proceeding with an arbitration -- or even of having an arbitration
award vacated 223 -- clearly may have personal economic consequences for arbitrators that could impact their impartiality.224

219. See, e.g., Childrens & Parents Rights Ass'n v. Sullivan, 787 F. Supp. 724, 731 (N.D. Ohio
1991) ("The doctrine of judicial immunity, which is favored because it allows judges to apply the
law without fear of personal consequences and prevents circumvention of the appellate process, does
not apply where the requested relief is injunctive.").
220. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L.
REV. 469, 473 (1998) (noting that the income of federal judges "is essentially unaffected by the
number of cases they decide"); cf.Brown v. Vance, 637 F.2d 272, 284 (5th Cir. 1981) (invalidating,
on due process grounds, a judicial compensation system in which the income of judges "depends
directly on the volume of cases filed").
221. See Hudson v. Chic. Teachers Union Local No. 1, 743 F.2d 1187, 1195 (7th Cir. 1984)
("The arbitrator, unlike a federal judge, is not paid a salary that is independent of the number of
cases he presides over .... "),affid, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA JASPER
ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 40 (6th ed. 2003) ("Ad hoc arbitrators typically charge on a
per diem basis for hearing time, travel time, and time spent studying the case and preparing the
decision ....
").
222. See Hudson, 743 F.2d at 1195 ("The arbitrator is paid for each arbitration, and this gives
him a financial interest ....
");Toppings v. Meritech Mortgage Servs., Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 683,
684 n.l (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (describing arbitrators who "receive payment for their services based
solely on the number of cases they handle"); Andrew T. Guzman, ArbitratorLiability: Reconciling
Arbitrationand Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1303 (2000) ("[T]he objectives of the arbitrator [are] furthered by an increase in the number of cases she handles.").
223. See Wright-Austin Co. v. Int'l Union, United Auto. Workers of Am., 422 F. Supp. 1364,
1371 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (suggesting that the parties to an arbitration might not be obligated to compensate an arbitrator whose award is vacated if their arbitration agreement "state[s] that the arbitrator
will only be compensated for his time and expenses if his Award is upheld by the courts"); cf Drahozal, supra note 220, at 502 (noting that "the incentives of arbitrators differ from the incentives of
trial court judges" because the compensation of judges "is the same regardless of how they decide
cases").
224. See Linney v. Turpen, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 824 (Ct. App. 1996) (Kline, J., dissenting)
(discussing "the conflict of interest created by the pecuniary interests of ... arbitrators whose income depends upon the number of cases they are selected to hear"); Donald J. Peterson & Julius
Rezler, Fee Setting and Other Administrative Practicesof Labor Arbitrators,68 LAB. ARB. (BNA)
1383, 1391 (1977) ("When ...a hearing [is] cancelled on such a short notice that the date cannot be
used for an alternate case, the arbitrator may well be out actual expenses as well as [the] opportunity
costs for a hearing date foregone."). See generally Florasynth, Inc., 750 F.2d at 173 (noting that
arbitrators often have interests "that overlap with the matter they are considering as arbitrators").
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In addition, while judicial and arbitral immunity both protect the decisionmaking process from reprisals by dissatisfied litigants,225 arbitral immunity is
also premised on an independent (although perhaps somewhat less compelling)226 policy rationale that is unique to arbitration227 -- the need to persuade
qualified individuals to serve as arbitrators. 2 28 This policy objective reflects an
important difference between arbitrators and judges (the latter of whom rarely
need to be recruited), 229 and militates in favor of extending greater protection to
arbitrators than is currently enjoyed by state court judges under Pulliam.23 °
In this regard, arbitrators may be compelled to expend personal resources in
" ' which they might not be
responding to claims for equitable relief,23
able to re225. See Corey, 691 F.2d at 1209-11; Austern, 898 F.2d at 882 (citing cases).
226. One federal court has characterized the goal of encouraging private actors to serve in
decision-making roles as a "less important 'immunity-producing concern"' than the need to assure
impartial decision-making. Murphy v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 76 F. Supp. 2d 489, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(quoting Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 411 (1997)).
227. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 235 ("Arbitral immunity cases follow two policy
strands, one common to both judges and arbitrators (finality and independence), the other peculiar to
arbitrators (which for lack of a better term we call 'recruitment')."); cf. United Auto. Workers, 701
F.2d at 1181 ("One of the policies underlying the doctrine of 'arbitral immunity' isthat of protecting
the integrity of the arbitrator or decision-making process from reprisals by dissatisfied parties.")
(emphasis added).
228. See Cori, 795 F. Supp. at 973 ("[A]rbitral immunity has a two-fold goal; to protect arbitrators from suit, and to ensure that there is a body of individuals willing to perform the service.");
Austern, 716 F. Supp. at 124 (stating that the need "to develop and maintain a pool of qualified
persons to act as arbitrators" is one of "two important policies that are promoted by according arbitrators immunity from suit"); Grane v. Grane, 493 N.E.2d 1112, 1119 (111.Ct. App. 1986) ("[Plart of
the reasoning to extend immunity to arbitrators is to encourage their voluntary participation in dispute resolution without being caught up in the struggle between the litigants and saddled with the
burdens of defending a lawsuit ...").
229. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 235 ("The second [policy rationale supporting
arbitral immunity] reflects significant distinctions between arbitrators and judges. A risk of liability
in extreme circumstances would not deter many applicants from the judiciary, but it might well limit
the number of those willing to serve as arbitrators."). But see Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704
F.2d 943, 952 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[F]orcing judges to defend their judicial rulings by standing trial on
the complaint of a disappointed litigant would make it difficult ... for society to recruit competent
judges.").
230. See Austern, 716 F. Supp. at 124 (noting that the need to recruit qualified persons to serve
as arbitrators supports "an expansive treatment of the conduct included within the scope of protection"); Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 234 (advocating "an immunity for the arbitrator at least
as
broad as a judge's"); cf.Hill, 263 F. Supp. at 326 ("If national policy encourages arbitration and if
arbitrators are indispensable agencies in the furtherance of that policy, then it follows that the common law rule protecting arbitrators from suit ought not only to be affirmed, but, if need be, expanded.").
231. See Toyota of Berkeley v. Auto. Salesmen's Union, Local 1095, 834 F.2d 751, 757 (9th
Cir. 1987) (observing that an arbitrator named as a defendant in an action to enjoin arbitration may
be "eager to defend himself' and can "hardly be expected to do nothing"), modified, 856 F.2d 1572
(9th Cir. 1988); Caso v. Coffey, 359 N.E.2d 683, 686 (N.Y. 1976) (noting that in the absence of
immunity, arbitrators may be required "to defend their awards in court.., at their own expense");
Forum Ins. Co. v. First Horizon Ins. Co., No. 87 C 2177, 1989 WL 65041, at *5 (N.D. l1. June 8,
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coup from the party asserting the claim. 232 While this expense will occasionally
be modest, 233 and the risk of incurring it thus may not have "the in terrorem
effect.., that the threat of a subsequent damage action would have, ' 34 it cannot
fairly be characterized as being of no consequence to the arbitrator.235 In this
respect, arbitrators are in a more vulnerable position than judges responding to
equitable claims. 23 6 Judges are likely to be "defended by government lawyers at
no cost . . . and with no risk of personal monetary lOSS ' ' 237 for the very reasons
that support immunizing judges - and arbitrators - from such claims altogether:
1989) (discussing the possibility that an arbitrator, "although shielded with immunity, would have to
bear the fees and costs of litigation arising out of the arbitration proceeding").
232. See, e.g., Toyota of Berkeley, 834 F.2d at 757 (noting the denial of an arbitrator's request
for an award of attorneys' fees and costs, even though the request was a "reasonable response" to
having been named as a defendant in an action to enjoin arbitration); Calzarano v. Liebowitz, 550 F.
Supp. 1389, 1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (refusing to award an arbitrator costs incurred in obtaining the
dismissal, on immunity grounds, of a claim that appeared to have been "groundless"); Feichtinger,
893 P.2d at 1268 (rejecting an arbitrator's contention that he should have received a larger award of
attorneys' fees in order to "discourage suits against arbitrators and thereby serve the public policies
behind arbitral immunity").
233.
Arbitrators occasionally elect not to respond to claims for equitable relief, choosing instead to rely on one of the real parties in interest to defend any challenge to their authority or to the
validity of an arbitration award. See, e.g., Folse v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 56 F.3d
603, 605 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (describing an arbitrator who had "not asserted immunity or... even
responded to [a] complaint" challenging his jurisdiction); Southwire Co. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n,
545 S.E.2d 681, 684 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that an arbitrator's "failure to file an answer and
its resulting default" was not "operative" against the real party in interest in an action to set aside an
arbitration award); see also Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 467
N.E.2d 87, 90 (Mass. 1984) (noting, in a union's action to enforce an arbitrator's award, that the
interests of the union and the arbitrator were "virtually identical").
234. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 117, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 401 U.S. 154 (1970); cf. De Abadia v. Izquierda Mora, 792 F.2d 1187, 1189
(1st Cir, 1986) ("The fear of being sued and held personally liable for damages is a far cry from a
suit for.., injunctive relief ..
") (bracketing omitted) (quoting Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083,
1091-92 n.4 (4th Cir 1984) (Hall, J., dissenting)).
235. See Star Distribs., Ltd., 613 F.2d at 7 ("The deterrent effect of the threat of injunctive
relief may be less but the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial ... remain.") (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). But cf. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 245 (asserting that
"injunctive and declaratory relief are prospective remedies of little concern to ad hoc arbitrators").
236. See, e.g., Ashlodge, Ltd. v. Hauser, 163 F.3d 681, 682 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998) ("We did not
request the judge to defend [her] order because she might have then felt obliged to do so and this
might have been an unfair imposition requiring the judge either personally or through an attorney to
spend money or time or both in connection with the [matter]."); cf. Noto, supra note 18, at 856
('Tihe task of defending against actions brought for injunctive relief, even where they do not succeed, [would] lay a substantial burden on judges.").
237. DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 718 (10th Cir. 1988); see
also Bryan, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 1260 (observing that "government attorneys should be made available
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The rationale for providing a government attorney to defend official acts
taken by judges is that such representation is necessary to ensure the independence of the judiciary. If a government attorney were not provided, judges would
be forced to hire counsel with their own private funds. Judges would then be
vulnerable to improper pressure created by threatened lawsuits. Furthermore,
lack of such protection would increase the difficulty in recruiting talented attorneys to join the... bench.238
This argument for immunizing arbitrators from equitable claims is even
more compelling if, as suggested by analogy to Pulliam,239 the failure to do so
would also subject them to potential attorneys' fee awards in favor of parties
who are successful in obtaining equitable relief.24 As one state court judge has
observed: "If it is thought that damages would deter ...independent and fearless decision-making, it must equally be conceded that the possibility of a [substantial] counsel fee accompanied by an injunction would deter even the most
stouthearted [individual] from deciding a case without fear of personal consequences." 24'
The foregoing analysis strongly suggests that failing to extend arbitral im22
munity to claims for equitable relief, like the threat of liability for damages,

to judges being forced to defend their official actions"); United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494,
505 (N.D. Cal. 1976) ("The United States Attorney customarily represents a federal judge in matters
involving his judicial actions.").
238. Tashima v. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 967 F.2d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 1992).
239. In Pulliam, the Supreme Court "held that 'judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective
injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity' or to [an award of] costs and
attorney's fees associated with the action." Kampfer, 989 F. Supp. at 201 (quoting Pulliam, 466
U.S. at 541-42); see also Affeldt v. Carr, 628 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (N.D. Ohio 1985) ("Pulliam
specifically held that judicial immunity does not bar an award of attorney's fees against a judicial
officer.").
240. See Sinicropi, 1994 WL 132233 at *2 ("[l]mmunity does not shield [an arbitrator] from
claims for attorney's fees if plaintiffs prevail in their quest for equitable relief."); cf. Society of
Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1224 n.7 (5th Cir. 1991) (Garwood, J., dissenting)
(asserting that an award of declaratory relief could be accompanied by an attorneys' fee award in "a
far more significant amount than any damages [a plaintiff] might have recovered").
241. Weisberger, supra note 43, at 554; see also Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 543 (finding "some
logic" to the contention that "the chilling effect of a damages award is no less ... when the award is
denominated attorney's fees"); Stepanek v. Delta County, 940 P.2d 364, 369 (Colo. 1997) (asserting
that the Pulliam Court found persuasive the argument that "imposing liability for attorney fees ...
would have the same effect on the proper functioning of the judiciary as money damages" because in
this context "attorney fees represent the functional equivalent of money damages").
242. See Pavetti, supra note 82, at 446 n.15 ("It is recognized that qualified people would have
a disincentive to serve as an arbitrator if he or she were to be subject to claims for monetary damages
by disgruntled [parties] after the arbitration."). See generally Mejia v. City of N.Y., 119 F. Supp. 2d
232, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (asserting that "private actors" may be "deterred by the threat of damages
suits from ... service").
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may deter qualified individuals from serving as arbitrators.243 Indeed, the drafters of the revised Uniform Arbitration Act appear to have concluded that subjecting arbitrators to any civil claims' would deter individuals from serving in
that capacity "because of the costs involved in defending even frivolous actions."" As the Califomia Court of Appeals, from whose jurisdiction the uniform act's immunity provision was taken, 2' has explained: "The proper challenge to an [arbitration] award is an action to vacate it brought against the other
party, the real adversary, not against the arbitrator.... Draggingarbitratorsinto
subsequent litigation would drastically interfere with their recruitment and independence."247
Finally, even if the potential burden of responding to claims for equitable
relief does not significantly deter individuals from serving as arbitrators,24 it is
243. See L & F. Corp., 493 F. Supp. at 150 (asserting that a failure to immunize arbitrators
from challenges to their authority would "discourage qualified arbitrators from lending their services"); Caso, 359 N.E.2d at 686 ("[A] requirement that those who serve on [arbitration] panels be
prepared to defend their awards in court, perhaps even at their own expense, could only work to
discourage qualified and competent persons from serving as arbitrators and, perhaps, even to frustrate the flexible design of the arbitral process itself.").
244. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 14(a) cmt., 7 U.L.A. at 32 (noting that "full immunity
from any civil proceedings is what is intended by the [act]") (emphasis added); cf. Weston, supra
note 31, at 473 (noting that "the drafters ... intended to provide nearly absolute certainty that legal
challenges to arbitral conduct are barred," and therefore "explicitly endorse[d] broad arbitral immunity").
245. Id. § 14(e) cmt., 7 U.LA. at 32-33; see also Austern, 716 F. Supp. at 124 (discussing "the
burden that would be placed on arbitrators ... if they had to defend frivolous lawsuits"). See generally Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 545 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The burdens of having to defend.., a suit
are identical in character and degree, whether the suit be for damages or prospective relief.").
246. The act's immunity provision "is based on the language of [a former California statute]
establishing immunity for arbitrators." UNiF. ARBITRATION ACT § 14(a) cmt., 7 U.L.A. at 31 (citing
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (repealed 1997)). It thus reflects a "policy determination that...
complete immunity [is] essential to encourage persons to serve as arbitrators." Coopers & Lybrand
v. Superior Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 713, 720 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added).
247. Stasz v. Schwab, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 116, 131 (Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting
Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 242); see also Skidmore v. Consol. Rail Corp., 619 F.2d 157, 159
(2d Cir. 1979) (noting that "the recruitment of qualified arbitrators" would be hindered if they "were
subject to lawsuits by dissatisfied [litigants]"); L & H Airco, 446 N.W.2d at 377 ("Permitting civil
suit.., would chill the willingness of arbitrators to serve .... ").
248. See Weston, supra note 31, at 484 n.159 ("No empirical study confirms the assumption
that... arbitrators ... would refuse to participate in arbitration without immunity."). In this regard,
it is clear that despite the risk of being sued for equitable relief, "[1]arge numbers of professional
arbitrators have been recruited, trained, enlisted and rehired as arbitrators in industry or securities
related groups." Onvoy, Inc. v. Shal, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344, 360 (Minn. 2003) (Gilbert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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likely to be reflected in the fees they charge for their services 249 and, accordingly, increase the overall cost of arbitration.25 0 Thus, subjecting arbitrators to
claims for equitable relief would be costly and inefficient, 251 and conflict with
one of the most important objectives of arbitration 252 -- providing an efficient
and inexpensive means of resolving disputes. 253 This fact alone suggests that
arbitrators should not be compelled (or even permitted) 254 to participate in litiga-

249. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 251 (suggesting that arbitrators who are not immune from suit will "pass the cost onto the parties"); Guzman, supra note 222, at 1327 (noting that
arbitrators "will be able to charge a lower price" if they "face fewer lawsuits"). See generally Country Best v. Christopher Ranch, LLC, 361 F.3d 629, 633 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that the price of
goods and services in a free market "is influenced by a variety of factors, including ... litigation
costs"); Oregon v. Assembly of God, Pentecostal, of Albany, 368 P.2d 937, 940 (Or. 1962) ("Where
private parties negotiate on a question of value the amount agreed upon frequently reflects the anticipated cost of litigation .... ).
250. See BEM I, L.L.C. v. Anthropologie, Inc., 301 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing
"the added cost of arbitration if parties can challenge arbitrators' legal errors in court"); Nolan &
Abrams, supra note 5, at 261 (noting that the involvement of arbitrators in litigation "would eventually increase arbitrators' fees, and thus the cost to the parties"); Guzman, supra note 222, at 1327
("[T]he arbitrator must be compensated for accepting the risk of liability. One would therefore
expect the costs of arbitration to increase at least slightly."). See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI,
supra note 221, at 40 ("In some instances the arbitrator's fee and expenses constitute the primary
cost of arbitration.").
251. See Fong v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (N.D. Cal. 1977) ("Since the
court.., is given full authority to act on the award, the appearance of the [arbitrator) wastes attorney
resources and clutters judicial proceedings with an unnecessary party."); Duffey v. Superior Court, 4
Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 340 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Even a 'small' lawsuit for declaratory relief can be expensive.").
252. See Blue Cross, 114 S.W.3d at 136 ("To permit a cause of action against an arbitrator, in
addition to the possibility of vacating the award, would contravene the purpose of arbitration.
Speed, cost savings, and a final determination would no longer characterize an arbitration proceeding."); cf. Prod. Employees Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 916 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1990)
(noting that courts are reluctant "to see the benefits of arbitration smothered by the costs and delay
of litigation").
253. See Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474 (10th Cir.
h
1996); cf. Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 42 ( 10 Cir. 1986) (observing that "a primary purpose
behind arbitration agreements is to avoid the expense and delay of court proceedings"); Diemaco,
Div. of Devtek Corp. v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d 228, 234 (D. Conn. 1998) ("The purpose of
arbitration is to avoid costly and protracted litigation.").
254. See, e.g., Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union, 467 N.E.2d at 90 (upholding trial
court's refusal to allow an arbitrator to participate in an action seeking to enforce his award); cf
Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 237 ("It is important to note that arbitral immunity exists for the
parties and the public, not for the arbitrators themselves.").
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tion contesting the arbitrability of a dispute 25 5 or the validity of an arbitration
award. 56
VII. CONCLUSION

Immunizing arbitrators from claims for damages enhances their impartiality 57 and, correspondingly, promotes the use of private arbitration as an alternative to litigation.25 8 The judicial recognition of this immunity also increases the
likelihood that individuals will agree to serve as arbitrators; 2 9 and, by reducing
the overall cost of engaging in arbitration,2" furthers the primary objective of
this alternative dispute resolution mechanism.261
255. See Southwire Co., 545 S.E.2d at 684-85 ("[T]he arbitrator is neither a necessary nor
proper party in a proceeding to enjoin arbitration."); Hospitality Ventures of Coral Springs, L.C. v.
Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 755 So. 2d 159, 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) ("The law does not require
potential arbitrators to expend the time and money to participate in a lawsuit where the parties are
fighting over the arbitrability of a dispute.").
256. See Lummus Global Amazonas, S.A. v. Aguaytia Energy Del Peru, S.R. LTDA, 256 F.
Supp. 2d 594, 626 (S.D. Tex. 2002) ("[T]he arbitrator's coerced involvement in post-award litigation
will inevitably intrude upon the arbitrator's quasi-judicial function and discourage qualified individuals from offering their services as arbitrators.") (quoting Frere v. Orthofix, Inc., No.
99CIV.4049(RMB)(MHD), 2000 WL 1789641, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2000)); Stasz, 17 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 131 ("[T]he arbitrator is not a proper party in a suit over the award and has no interest in the
dispute once the award is rendered. Given this lack of interest, judicial economy requires dismissal
of the unnecessary party.") (quoting Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 242 (footnotes omitted)).
257. See Cort, 795 F. Supp. at 972 (noting that arbitrators are granted immunity "[i]n order to
encourage independent judgment"); Feichtinger, 893 P.2d at 1267 (stating that arbitral immunity
"enhances the impartiality and independence of arbitrators"); Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397,
401 (N.J. 1984) ("The grant of immunity serves to preserve the arbitrator's integrity and independence, and to ensure that arbiters will act upon their convictions, free from the apprehension of adverse consequences.").
258. See Feichtinger, 893 P.2d at 1267 ("Arbitral immunity encourages the settlement of
disputes by arbitrators.... Exposing arbitrators to personal liability would weaken the effectiveness
and attractiveness of arbitration as an alternative to litigation."); cf Corey, 691 F.2d at 1210
("[lIndividuals will not avail themselves of arbitration by contractual agreement if they lack confidence in the impartiality and reliability of the arbitration process").
259. See Feichtinger,893 P.2d at 1267 (noting that arbitral immunity "makes it easier to recruit
arbitrators"); Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 237 ("Without [arbitral immunity] ... the parties
might find it more difficult to persuade competent people to serve as arbitrators.").
260. The prospect of an action to vacate an arbitration award (or an action to "prevent arbitration") obviously makes arbitration "more costly" than it would be in the absence of that possibility.
Prod. Employees Local 504, 916 F.2d at 1163. The cost of arbitration undoubtedly would be even
greater if, in addition to entertaining 'the possibility of vacating the award," a court also might
"permit a cause of action against [the] arbitrator." Blue Cross, 114 S.W.3d at 136; cf. Diapulse
Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that "judicial review of an
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The same considerations support interpreting the arbitral immunity doctrine
to shield arbitrators from claims for equitable relief262 -- that is, to provide them
'
with "immunity from suit, not just from damages."263
Because the policies underlying arbitration are best served if arbitrators have no obligation to defend
their decisions (or their authority) in judicial proceedings,2" they should be immune from claims for equitable as well as monetary relief.265 In those rare instances in which that outcome is precluded by stare decisis,2 6 essentially the
same result can be reached by holding that arbitrators are not proper parties to
judicial proceedings arising from the arbitral process.267

arbitration award should be, and is, very narrowly limited" because the "purpose of arbitration is to
permit a relatively quick and inexpensive resolution of ... disputes by avoiding the expense and
delay of extended court proceedings").
261. See Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526 (l1th Cir. 1997)
(noting that parties utilize arbitration "in order to reduce the costs of resolving [their] disputes");
Prod.Employees Local 504, 916 F.2d at 1163 (discussing "arbitration's promise to expedite and cut
the costs of resolving disputes"); White v. Preferred Research, Inc., 432 S.E.2d 506, 508 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1993) (stating that arbitration is "an alternative means for resolving disputes without the cost
and delay of a lawsuit").
262. See Coleman, 550 F. Supp. at 684 ("The purpose of... immunity ... is not served by
protecting a [decision-maker] from actions for damages while exposing him to an action for injunctive relief.") (discussing judicial immunity); cf. Zimmerman, 428 F. Supp. at 761 ("The reasons for
the rule of judicial immunity apply regardless of the nature of the relief sought.").
263. Johnson v. Miller, 925 F. Supp. 334, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (describing judicial immunity);
see also Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Absolute immunity establishes
both a right not to pay damages and a 'right not to be tried' - that is, it grants freedom from the
emotional travail, commitment of time, and legal expense involved in going to trial.").
264. See Fong, 431 F. Supp. at 1343-44 ("[T]he integrity of the arbitral process is best preserved by recognizing the arbitrators as independent decision-makers who have no obligation to
defend themselves in a reviewing court."); Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 266 ("Courts ... foster
private dispute resolution mechanisms by discouraging the involvement of arbitrators in postaward
litigation.").
265. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 229 ("With very few exceptions [the arbitral immunity] doctrine protects arbitrators both from personal liability for their actions and from compelled involvement in postaward legal proceedings.").
266. Cf. United Food & Commercial Workers, 138 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2919 n.3 ("At the
outset the court recognizes that the law governing arbitral immunity is not highly developed and that
no existing case law is controlling in this matter.").
267. See Weston, supra note 31, at 505-06 ("The policy justifications for conferring immunity
can be assuaged by reframing the question, not as to whether the arbitral actors are per se immune,
but rather by identifying, as to the particular claim presented: Who is the real party in interest?").
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